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Abstract | The pressures of developing and maintaining intricate social 
relationships may have led to the evolution of enhanced cognitive abili-
ties in many social nonhuman species, particularly primates. Knowledge 
of the dominance ranks and social relationships of other individuals, for 
example, is important in evaluating one’s position in the prevailing affili-
ative and dominance networks within a primate society and could be 
acquired through direct or perceived experience. Our analysis of allog-
rooming supplants among wild bonnet macaques had revealed that indi-
vidual females successfully evaluate social relationships among other 
group females and possess egotistical knowledge of their own positions, 
relative to those of others, in the social hierarchy. These individuals, 
therefore, appeared to have abstracted and mentally represented their 
own personal attributes as well as those of other members of the group. 
Bonnet macaques also seem to recognise that other individuals have 
beliefs that may be different from their own, manipulate another indi-
vidual’s actions and beliefs in a variety of social situations, and selec-
tively reveal or withhold information from others—capabilities displayed 
by certain individuals that became evident in the course of our earlier 
studies on tactical deception in the species. In conclusion, the ability to 
develop belief systems and form mental representations, generated by 
direct personal experience, suggests a rather early evolutionary origin 
for fairly sophisticated cognitive capabilities, characterised by an objec-
tified self with limited regulatory control over more subjective levels of 
self-awareness, in cercopithecine primates, pre-dating those of the great 
apes. We, therefore, argue, in this review, that bonnet macaques might 
represent an intermediate stage in the evolution of self-awareness, a 
process which began with the subjective awareness that characterises 
most, if not all, higher animal species and culminates in the most sophis-
ticated form of symbolic self-awareness, apparently the hallmark of the 
human species alone.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies on the cognitive abilities of 
nonhuman primates and their underlying mech-
anisms developed primarily because we assume 
that their intelligence and, if one may use the 
term, minds are most like our own. Through 
our understanding of them, we would possibly 
one day understand what it is like to be essen-
tially human1,4. However, this view that they are 
most like us also coexists in our minds with the 
equally pervasive idea that nonhuman primates 
differ fundamentally from us because they lack 
sophisticated language, and may, thus, also lack 
some of the capacities necessary for reason-
ing and abstract thought5,6. Given our current 
understanding of the cognitive abilities of many 
primates, including the possible existence of rudi-
mentary semantic communication in some spe-
cies,7,8 however, it is possible that comparative 
studies on primate taxa may yet throw light on 
the nature and evolution of different human cog-
nitive abilities, including consciousness.9
A feature that commonly characterises most 
primates, including monkeys, apes and humans, 
is the presence of a complex society in which 
individuals spend most of their lives. Extensive 
social interactions among individuals of differ-
ent ages, sexes, dominance ranks and kinship are 
typical of many of these societies.10,11 The devel-
opment and maintenance of such complex social 
relationships—each different in its own way—are 
believed to have placed unusual demands and 
selected for enhanced cognitive abilities in indi-
viduals living in such societies.12–14 An important 
component of such social cognition is the social 
knowledge that individual primates might possess 
with regard to certain attributes of other individ-
uals that they regularly interact with within their 
social group. In addition to the obvious recogni-
tion of each animal as a distinct individual, the 
possible attributes that such knowledge might 
encompass could include, amongst others, knowl-
edge of the dominance ranks of other individu-
als and an awareness of the social bonds between 
other members of the group—both factors that 
seem to influence much of the social behaviour 
observed in primate societies. As such societies 
are typically characterised by both competition 
and cooperation, it becomes possibly even more 
important that individuals are able to consistently 
evaluate its own position in the prevailing rank 
hierarchy and social affiliative networks, and thus 
obtain knowledge of one’s own self.
2  Social Knowledge in Nonhuman 
Primates
Several earlier observational and experimen-
tal studies have clearly shown that individual 
baboons,15–19 macaques20; Datta,21–24 vervet 
monkeys25–27 and chimpanzees28,29 are knowl-
edgeable about the relationships of their social 
companions; such knowledge seems to be usu-
ally acquired by observing the social interactions 
of other individuals. What is not entirely clear 
from the previous studies, however, is the nature 
of inferences that allows such knowledge to be 
acquired. Does an individual evaluate the social 
bonding between each of the interacting pairs 
of individuals relative to itself? Or, is it simply 
aware of the extent of the affiliative relationships 
enjoyed by another group member without spe-
cifically remembering each and every pair bond? 
At a more functional level, what is the relative 
importance of the frequency of affiliative interac-
tions as opposed to the time spent in these inter-
actions for such an assessment?
In an early experimental study that attempted 
to understand how nonhuman primates concep-
tualise social relationships, Bachmann and Kum-
mer15 showed that a male hamadryas baboon 
(Papio hamadryas) was less likely to challenge a 
female possessed by another male, the stronger 
her affiliation with her companion. Hamadryas 
baboon males were thus apparently able to assess 
the social choice of females, but the experiment 
could not exclude the possibility that the entire 
relationship was read from the behaviour of only 
one of the group members. In other words, it is 
still not clear whether an individual can concep-
tualise the multiple relationships of a potential 
adversary, information that cannot obviously be 
obtained on the basis of the behaviour of a single 
individual alone. Extending this problem further, 
if knowledge about the social relationships of a 
number of group members can be simultane-
ously acquired, is an individual able to integrate 
information about all interactants when involved 
in a complex social interaction with more than 
one partner?
Yet another important functional aspect of 
knowledge acquisition and use involves the spe-
cific aspect of an attribute that an individual 
evaluates as it takes a particular decision. When 
a female macaque female acts on her knowledge 
of the dominance ranks of her social compan-
ions, for example, does she take into account 
their absolute ranks independent of her own, or 
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does she evaluate their respective positions in the 
dominance hierarchy relative to her own particu-
lar rank?
3  What Do Bonnet Macaques Know?
Our insights into the social knowledge, includ-
ing knowledge of one’s own self, in nonhuman 
primates come from behavioural observations 
on the adult females of a wild troop of bonnet 
macaques (Macaca radiata) inhabiting dry decid-
uous scrubland and mixed forests around Banga-
lore city in southern India.24
We documented a particular kind of a com-
petitive interaction for access to grooming part-
ners between adult females—allogrooming 
supplants—in which a dominant female displaces 
one member of a pair of grooming females, both 
subordinate to her. There were 75 such observed 
triadic interactions and in 63 of these (84% of 
the cases, or the ‘usual’ cases), the more subordi-
nate of the two individuals that were approached 
(henceforth referred to as ‘subordinate’) retreated 
even before the dominant female (the ‘domi-
nant’) could reach them. In the remaining 12 
instances (16% of the cases, or the ‘exceptional’ 
cases), however, the more dominant member of 
the dyad (the ‘intermediate’) moved away. As the 
majority of these supplants consisted of the sub-
ordinate individual retreating, it is plausible that 
such females prefer to avoid two higher-ranking 
individuals in such situations. Assuming that 
this is indeed true, what factors could have moti-
vated the intermediate individual to retreat in the 
exceptional cases?
The proportion of retreats exhibited by the 
intermediate and subordinate individuals during 
these triadic interactions were not different from 
what would be expected on the basis of their 
behaviour during dyadic approaches, thus rul-
ing out the simple hypothesis that retreats dur-
ing grooming supplants could be guided by the 
outcome of simple one-to-one interactions that 
are much more frequent between pairs of adult 
females.24 The outcome of behavioural interac-
tions between adult female cercopithecine pri-
mates often depends on the respective positions 
that they occupy in the dominance hierarchy. In 
addition, inter-individual aggression is invariably 
directed down the hierarchy and usually serves to 
reinforce the dominance status of each female.11 
Could grooming females being supplanted decide 
to remain in place or retreat on the basis of their 
dominance ranks? Rank difference between the 
specific dominant, intermediate and subordinate 
individuals involved, considered in pairs, did 
not differ significantly across the usual and the 
exceptional cases. Aggressive interactions initiated 
by the dominant females towards their interme-
diate and subordinate counterparts, examined 
across the entire observation period, also could 
not explain the behavioural difference of the sup-
planted females in the two situations.24
Could the intermediate individual in the 
exceptional cases be avoiding the approaching 
dominant female since she is aware of a prefer-
ence of the latter for the subordinate individual 
as a social partner? The dominant females did 
not appear to discriminate between the sub-
ordinate and the intermediate individuals as 
grooming partners with regard to time spent in 
grooming them, respectively, either in the usual 
or in the exceptional cases.24 This would make it 
unlikely that, in the exceptional cases, the inter-
mediates retreated because of a preference of 
the dominant females for the subordinates over 
them.
To summarise, the proportion of times that 
a subordinate female remains in place dur-
ing an allogrooming supplant is not affected by 
her dominance rank, rank differences with the 
approaching female and her grooming compan-
ion, or the agonistic relationships between these 
individuals. Her response during these triadic 
allogrooming supplants also does not appear to 
be influenced by her corresponding behaviour 
when approached by dominant females during 
dyadic interactions.
4  Knowledge of Social Relationships
A different perspective to the decision-making 
process during triadic supplants could involve 
the act of not retreating performed by the sub-
ordinate female. When the identities of all the 
subordinate individuals involved in these 75 
interactions were examined, a significant positive 
correlation was observed between their indices 
of social attractiveness (defined as the reciprocal 
of the coefficients of variation for allogrooming 
duration received from all other females in the 
troop) and their propensity not to retreat when 
approached, measured as the proportion of all 
approaches received (as the subordinate member 
of the triad) in which they were not supplanted.24 
The reciprocal of the coefficient of variation 
(mean/standard deviation) of the allogrooming 
that an adult female receives from other females 
can be maximised by increasing values of the 
mean, decreasing values of the standard devia-
tion, or a combination of both factors. High val-
ues of this measure thus represent the consistency 
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with which an individual is preferred as a groom-
ing partner by other females, and was, there-
fore, be used as an index of social attractiveness 
of that particular individual. Such indices were 
computed in terms of both, the frequency and 
the duration of allogrooming received by these 
individuals.
The above interpretation, therefore, implies 
that the subordinate member of a supplanted dyad 
was less likely to retreat, on being approached by 
a dominant female, when she was more socially 
attractive than her dominant grooming partner. 
This relationship, however, held only when social 
attractiveness was considered in terms of allog-
rooming time received by these individuals but 
not with respect to the frequency of grooming 
received by them. Moreover, no relationship could 
be discerned between the propensity to remain in 
place when approached and social attractiveness 
for the intermediate females of the triads, either 
for grooming time or frequency received.24 Exten-
sive bootstrapping simulations by random sam-
pling of subordinate females from those involved 
in the 75 observed supplants confirmed that the 
observed correlation between the proportion of 
times that a subordinate female did not retreat 
when approached and her social attractiveness in 
terms of allogrooming duration was indeed sig-
nificantly different from that expected by chance 
alone.24 This, therefore, leads us to the conclusion 
that the intermediate female (that is, the domi-
nant partner of the dyad) may actually be aware 
of the social attractiveness of the individual that 
she is currently with, and accordingly tend to 
retreat when approached by a still more dominant 
female.
It must be pointed out that the female 
macaques in our study troop did not appear to 
recognise and/or react to the social bonds that 
apparently exist between particular pairs of 
females (Sinha, unpublished observations). This 
is borne out by the fact that in the exceptional 
instances where the intermediate individuals 
retreated, the approaching dominant females did 
not appear to discriminate in directing groom-
ing towards the subordinate and the intermediate 
individuals either with regard to the frequency 
of initiated events or the subsequent duration 
of grooming given to them. What is illuminat-
ing, however, is that these females nevertheless 
appeared to be responding to the social attrac-
tiveness of their partners as evaluated by the uni-
formity with which the latter received grooming 
from the other troop members. It is neither the 
mean grooming time received by the target indi-
vidual nor the variation in the number of troop 
members who groom her that are independently 
being taken into account, but a combination of 
both factors.
Bachmann and Kummer’s15 classic study on 
the hamadryas baboon was one of the earliest 
attempts to demonstrate that primates may 
be aware of the social relationships of others 
and take decisions on the basis of such knowl-
edge. Their experiments, however, could not 
distinguish whether it was indeed the social 
interactions that were providing cues to the 
observer, or simply the behavioural patterns of 
either of the two interacting individuals. Our 
study, however, showed that bonnet macaque 
females might be aware of the allogrooming 
that other individuals might be receiving from 
different members of the group. Knowledge 
of this kind, encompassing the multiple social 
relationships of target individuals, clearly needs 
to be acquired from observations of the actual 
social interactions of all the individuals involved 
in these relationships. It is very unlikely that 
the macaque females are simply reacting to 
the behavioural cues being provided by each 
observed individual in the troop.
To react to particular social relationships 
between pairs of group members, an individual 
would have to memorise the pattern of interac-
tions among each pair. Observation and memori-
sation could suffice in small primate groups that 
are relatively stable over time but would obviously 
place increasingly difficult cognitive demands on 
an individual either as the group size increases 
or its composition changes (see also Ref. 26) 
An alternative strategy that bonnet macaque 
females seem to have evolved is to obtain an 
impression of the social attractiveness of another 
individual with regard to its affinity to the other 
group members without specifically remember-
ing each and every pairwise interaction. Such an 
ability would obviously appear to make the task 
of evaluating one’s own position in the group’s 
social network much less cognitively demanding.
But what do individuals actually observe and 
memorise? Whenever dominant females in the 
allogrooming dyad took a decision to move away, 
they appeared to do so primarily on the basis of 
the consistency with which the other females in 
the troop spent grooming time with her subor-
dinate partner. It is interesting that the females 
seemed to be reacting more to the duration of 
grooming that the other individual received (as 
measured by the total time spent by her in this 
activity) than to the actual frequency of the initi-
ated events. This would require that the observer 
simply scan the target individuals periodically 
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to note whether she is being groomed instead of 
remembering the actual number of times that an 
individual has been groomed. Again, this calls for 
a cognitively simpler mechanism to obtain the 
desired information. In addition, individuals also 
apparently need to remember whether different 
group members are uniformly grooming the tar-
get female during these scans.
5  Knowledge of Dominance Ranks
When all the 75 cases of competition for allog-
rooming partners were considered, there was 
a strong positive correlation between the fre-
quency of approaches a female had received 
as the intermediate member of the triad and 
her social attractiveness in terms of grooming 
frequency received from all the other females 
in the group. This was in spite of the fact that 
the intermediate and subordinate individuals 
in the approached dyads did not differ in their 
social attractiveness in terms of grooming fre-
quency or duration. In contrast, no relation-
ship could be discerned at all between these 
parameters and the frequency of approaches 
received by the subordinate members of the 
allogrooming dyads. This clearly indicated that 
individuals who were more socially attractive 
as grooming companions for the females in 
the group were approached at comparatively 
greater rates by more dominant individuals. 
The important point here is that this did not 
hold true for the same females if they were the 
subordinate members in the supplanted dyad. 
The approaching dominant females, therefore, 
appeared to be well aware of the relative domi-
nance ranks of the two approached females, 
both subordinate to her.
Support for the possibility that there could 
indeed be a preference for the intermediate 
females came also from the direct observations of 
25 instances when a dominant female approached 
two allogrooming subordinates and proceeded 
to herself groom one of them. The dominant 
member of the dyad was preferentially groomed 
on a significant majority of 20 of these occa-
sions; the subordinate received attention in only 
five instances. Consequently, these results would 
argue that the approaching female may be specifi-
cally attending to the more dominant member of 
the approached dyad, and therefore, she must be 
aware of the relative ranks of the two approached 
individuals.
The conclusion that an adult female bonnet 
macaque might indeed be aware of the domi-
nance ranks of the other females in the group 
was also supported by data from yet another 
kind of triadic interaction. On 17 occasions, 
a dominant female approached two of her 
grooming subordinates and supplanted one 
of them through aggressive interactions.24 In 
13 of these instances, the more subordinate of 
the two females was attacked while the inter-
mediate individual received aggression on the 
remaining four occasions. Aggression was thus 
more significantly directed towards the subor-
dinate individual than would be expected if the 
dominant female were to attack either of the 
females randomly.
An attempt was made to examine the fac-
tors that could motivate approaching females 
to preferentially exhibit aggression towards 
more subordinate females when supplanting 
a member of a grooming dyad.24 The domi-
nant females, involved in these 13 particular 
interactions, did not show any inherent prefer-
ence in directing grooming (in terms of either 
frequency or duration) towards the intermedi-
ate individual over that towards the subordi-
nate one over the entire observation period. 
The intermediate females were also not more 
socially attractive (in grooming frequency or 
duration) than were their subordinate compan-
ions. Finally, as compared to their intermedi-
ate counterparts, the subordinate females had 
not necessarily received more aggression from 
these particular dominant individuals in dyadic 
interactions over the observation period.
Is it nevertheless possible that the dominant 
female was aware of a differential response made 
by individuals of different ranks to aggression 
shown by her during dyadic interactions? The 
proportion of approaches received by females 
from more dominant individuals to which they 
retreated did not, however, correlate with their 
absolute ranks; dominant females may not thus 
be able to use such behavioural responses as cues 
to the relative ranks of their subordinates. There 
was also not a single instance during the entire 
observation period when any of the intermedi-
ate females, though often close in rank to the 
dominant individuals, had ever been observed 
to threaten or attack any of the latter (Sinha, 
unpublished data). On the other hand, a surpris-
ing result was that dominant females were sig-
nificantly more likely to attack subordinates of 
higher rank than those of relatively lower ranks 
during dyadic interactions24; this was in complete 
contrast to their behaviour during triadic inter-
actions. Taken together, these results suggest that 
a dominant individual may be well aware of the 
ranks of two grooming females and may choose 
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to show aggression more towards the subordi-
nate member of the dyad when she has a choice 
of supplanting one of them. These contrasting 
behavioural patterns also suggest that females 
may also choose different strategies depending 
on the prevailing situation; a more subordinate 
female is thus attacked only when another female 
is present.
How do macaque females assess individual 
ranks? Do they follow a brute force method 
by which individuals observe and remember 
dyadic interactions between each and every 
pair of troop members and then conclude 
a linear hierarchy? Alternatively, are bonnet 
macaques capable of inferring linear orders by 
associative transitivity30? Such processing of 
serial information would be advantageous in 
allowing them to deduce individual ranks in the 
hierarchy from partial knowledge of agonistic 
relationships without having to observe inter-
actions between every pair of individuals (for a 
discussion, see Ref. 7) Future studies under con-
trolled conditions in the laboratory may provide 
an answer to this dichotomy.
6  Decision‑Making During Allogrooming 
Supplants
Knowledge of dominance ranks and social 
attractiveness could thus be important fac-
tors that influence the probability that an indi-
vidual will decide to either retreat or stay back 
during grooming supplants. It was, of course, 
clear that neither of these factors, by them-
selves, were of absolute importance since, in 
each case, it was not necessarily the dominant 
or the more attractive individual which failed to 
retreat. It thus became of interest to understand 
which of these aspects of an individual’s social 
knowledge of her grooming companion corre-
late with the decision to retreat during a triadic 
interaction.
Each member of the 75 approached dyads 
either retreated or failed to do so; the depend-
ent variable was thus a binary one and could be 
influenced by a number of independent vari-
ables. Logistic regression analysis31,32 was thus 
used to determine the factors that may critically 
influence the decision of a female in a groom-
ing dyad to retreat when approached by a more 
dominant individual.24 The independent vari-
ables that were considered in these analyses 
included the individual’s own dominance rank, 
rank of the approaching dominant female, rank 
difference with the approaching female, rank of 
the grooming companion, rank difference with 
the grooming companion, the individual’s own 
social attractiveness in terms of the duration of 
grooming received by her from other females 
and the ranked difference in attractiveness with 
the grooming companion. Social attractiveness 
was considered only for duration of groom-
ing received since this measure was found to be 
important for the macaques’ knowledge of allo-
grooming relationships. Regression was carried 
out with all these variables taken one at a time 
as well as with all of them considered together.24 
The influence of the absolute dominance rank 
or social attractiveness was investigated by two 
slightly different approaches: once by includ-
ing these variables directly as such, and once by 
including the difference in rank or attractiveness 
between the two individuals in the set of inde-
pendent variables.
The first set of models examined the rela-
tive influence of the different variables on the 
probability that any female in an allogroom-
ing dyad would retreat when approached by 
a more dominant individual.24 Two regression 
coefficients, namely those associated with an 
individual’s own dominance rank and with rank 
difference with the approaching female, were 
significant. According to this model, therefore, 
an individual had an increased probability of 
retreating as its position in the rank hierarchy 
fell, as it did when the approaching individual 
was relatively closer to it in rank. In contrast, 
an alternate model that incorporated the 
absolute dominance rank of the approaching 
female, instead of that for rank difference with 
her, failed to explain the observed patterns of 
retreats.24 It is important to note here that as 
these models included decision-making by 
both the members of the grooming dyad as the 
dependent variable (n = 150, derived from 75 
interactions), they would consistently fail to dis-
tinguish between the knowledge of one’s own 
rank or attractiveness and that of the corre-
sponding properties of the grooming compan-
ion. Knowledge about oneself was, however, 
preferentially incorporated into the tested 
models, as it is less cognitively demanding.
To examine more explicitly the combined 
influence of social attractiveness and domi-
nance rank, the following alternate approach 
was also explored.24 Models were constructed 
using, as the binary-dependent variable, either 
the decision of the dominant member of the 
grooming dyad or that of the more socially 
attractive one to retreat or not to do so, but 
maintaining the same independent variables as 
above. Absolute rank and attractiveness of the 
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grooming companion could also be now legiti-
mately incorporated into these models as inde-
pendent variables.
Rank difference with both, the approaching 
individual and the allogrooming companion, 
were found to significantly influence the prob-
ability of retreat of the more dominant member 
of the dyad in a particular model described in 
Sinha.24 Such an individual was, therefore, more 
likely to retreat when the approaching female 
became relatively less dominant to her while 
the grooming companion became progres-
sively more subordinate. An alternate model 
that incorporated knowledge of the absolute 
dominance ranks of the approaching individual 
and the grooming companion as well as the 
social attractiveness of the latter instead of their 
values relative to one’s own, however, failed to 
reveal a significant influence by any of the inde-
pendent variables.
Why would a dominant female retreat more 
often when she was with a relatively more 
subordinate individual? One solution to this 
problem possibly lies in the strong positive cor-
relation that was observed between the rank 
difference of the dominant members of the 
dyads with their subordinate companions and 
their difference in social attractiveness in terms 
of grooming duration received.24 Increasingly, 
more subordinate companions were, therefore, 
relatively more attractive as grooming partners 
to all the females in the group, and the retreat-
ing dominant females may have been aware of 
this relationship.
Regression models were also constructed to 
examine the influence of the different independ-
ent variables on the probability of the more 
socially attractive member of the grooming dyad 
retreating. Either of two alternative models, 
which surprisingly yielded identical estimates for 
the respective significant variables, could explain 
the observed behavioural patterns.24 It was not 
possible, therefore, to determine which of the 
two variables—dominance rank of one’s com-
panion or rank difference with her—was more 
important in influencing the behaviour of these 
individuals. An alternative model that used these 
two variables alone yielded a good fit with the 
observed data but failed to assign priority to any 
of them.24 Rank difference with the approaching 
female was, however, no longer a significant fac-
tor in these models. This last set of models, thus, 
clearly showed that the more socially attractive 
member of an allogrooming dyad was more likely 
to retreat (in spite of her popularity) as her com-
panion became increasingly dominant to her.
To summarise, our logistic regression analy-
sis indicated that the two most important factors 
that were taken into consideration for a decision 
to be made to move away or stay on during allo-
grooming supplants included knowledge of the 
subject’s own dominance rank and her rank dif-
ference with the approaching dominant female. A 
model that incorporated the absolute rank of the 
latter failed to explain the observed behavioural 
patterns. Individuals, therefore, clearly appear 
to be aware not only of their own positions in 
the rank hierarchy but also of that of the other 
females in the troop. What is more interesting, 
however, is that this knowledge of another indi-
vidual’s dominance rank seems to be acquired 
only relative to one’s own; a female knows of her 
rank difference with another female but does not 
appear to be aware of the absolute position of her 
adversary in the rank hierarchy. This finding rein-
forces the view that social knowledge of primates 
might primarily be of an egotistical nature in that 
knowledge of another individual’s attributes is 
best acquired and conceptualised in terms of the 
subject’s own attributes. Knowledge of the abso-
lute is also likely to be more cognitively demand-
ing than knowledge of the relative, especially that 
based on the self. Relative knowledge of this kind 
can be easily obtained when the subject actively 
interacts with another individual; its acquisition 
does not necessarily require that she observe and 
memorise social interactions between other indi-
viduals and which do not involve her.
Rank difference with the approaching female 
and with the grooming companion appeared to 
be important motivating factors when the more 
dominant member of an allogrooming dyad 
decided to retreat on being approached. Individu-
als are thus clearly able to simultaneously process 
information about all their interacting com-
panions and then use this knowledge effectively 
during complex social interactions. The compu-
tations involved in this particular situation were 
further complicated by the fact that the inter-
mediate female in a grooming supplant chose to 
retreat as the approaching individual became rel-
atively less dominant to her while her grooming 
companion was comparatively more subordinate. 
Females in the study troop became increasingly 
socially attractive to others as they occupied 
progressively lower positions in the dominance 
hierarchy. A possible reason, therefore, for the 
intermediate female retreating in spite of being 
more dominant was the increasing attractiveness 
of her grooming companion. Again, the more 
socially attractive individual in the grooming 
dyad decided to leave only when her companion 
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became progressively more dominant to her. 
Taken together, it seems evident that high domi-
nance ranks of individuals can compensate for 
their lower attractiveness and vice versa during 
grooming supplants.
Moreover, our findings suggest that individu-
als appear to be capable of not only integrating 
information about both their partners but seem 
to be simultaneously accessing different domains 
of their knowledge—those for dominance ranks 
and for social relationships—while making a 
decision; such knowledge is thus functionally 
integrative. Surprisingly, however, the logistic 
regression models failed to ascribe direct signifi-
cance to knowledge of social attractiveness, either 
of one’s own or of that of others, in the decision-
making process.24 Is it then possible that infor-
mation about social bonds is acquired in terms of 
their correlated dominance ranks? If this is true, 
it would suggest that, as in humans, knowledge in 
this nonhuman species is hierarchically organised 
as well. Certain categories or domains of knowl-
edge could thus be much more easily accessible 
than others to individuals, and these domains 
could be preferentially used for the storage of 
related information from other categories.
An important observation in our study on 
social knowledge was that individual macaques 
seem to be knowledgeable about the general 
social attractiveness of particular females in 
terms of the allogrooming that they receive from 
other individuals, rather than remember specific 
pairwise affiliative relationships.24 As mentioned 
earlier, they also appear to know the relative dom-
inance rank of each adult female in the troop—a 
clear example of recognition and knowledge of 
the individual attributes of one’s group members. 
What is most relevant and significant for this 
review, however, is that the decision to retreat or 
remain behind during allogrooming supplants 
depended on the absolute position of the actor in 
the dominance hierarchy—the more subordinate 
an individual the more likely she was to retreat. 
Clearly then, each female bonnet macaque has 
knowledge of some of her own individual attrib-
utes—knowledge that she has acquired through 
her own direct interactions with her group 
members.
7  Intentional Tactical Deception 
in Bonnet Macaques
Human-like deception requires that an individual 
who signals information create a false belief in 
another individual, the audience. The signaller 
thus recognises that the mind of the audience can 
be in a state of knowledge different from one’s 
own and that it is possible to alter and hence, 
control mental states of others without necessar-
ily changing one’s own. Such manipulations are 
usually tactical in that they involve the use of acts 
from the normal repertoire of the actor in situa-
tions where they are likely to be misinterpreted by 
the audience—leading to some tangible benefit 
for the actor with or without some correspond-
ing cost to the audience.33,34 All such acts of tacti-
cal deception are thus functional, and most cases 
of deception documented in primates have been 
included in this category.33
But is primate deception truly intentional 
and moreover, attributable to a theory of mind 
(see Ref. 35 for a theoretical discussion)? Does 
the deceiver actually attempt to alter the beliefs 
of another individual when it actively suppresses 
some information from it or signals false infor-
mation to the other? Intentional communica-
tion, as postulated in humans, thus requires an 
understanding of the mental states of articulators, 
which, in turn, requires complex cognitive capac-
ities.36,37 Subsequently, intentionality in nonhu-
man communication systems was operationalised 
through different orders of intentionality38–40; see 
also Ref. 41 Zero-order intentionality, for example, 
is a merely reflexive communication, not involv-
ing any sophisticated cognitive process. Higher 
orders of intentionality, on the other hand, 
involves some recognition of the one’s own men-
tal states as well as those of the audience, culmi-
nating in the capacity of the actor to successfully 
communicate its own intentions and goals to the 
audience, the characteristic feature of third-order 
intentionality.38,40,42,43
Given the difficulty of empirically establish-
ing the presence and recognition of mental states 
in both human infants and non-verbal animals, 
however, various general behavioural criteria have 
been suggested to qualify a behavioural signal to 
be intentional.44–48 These criteria include (1) the 
social use of the behavioural act, as indicated by 
it being directed to particular recipients, modi-
fied by various factors, such as the presence or 
composition of the attendant audience; (2) sen-
sitivity of the signaller to the attentional states of 
the recipients; (3) manipulation of the attentional 
states of recipients to attract attention, particu-
larly when a mutual attention state between the 
signaller and recipient is absent, such as the actor 
moving itself into the line of view of a recipient; 
(4) monitoring the responses of the audience and 
(5) persistence in the production and/or elabo-
ration of the behavioural signal until a desired 
communicative goal is met.
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Our analysis of 128 events of social interac-
tions of a potentially deceptive nature, which we 
observed in three different study bonnet macaque 
troops,41 provide evidence for the majority of 
these constituting intentional acts of tactical 
deception, at least in terms of the behavioural 
criteria listed above. The troops, however, dif-
fered widely with regard to the social situations 
in which tactical deception was displayed—com-
petition for food (effectively obtaining food from 
another individual), sexual encounters (avoiding 
sexual advances from other individuals, success-
fully pursuing one’s own sexual interests and dis-
rupting the sexual pursuits of other individuals), 
aggressive interactions (avoid aggression directed 
at oneself, effectuate aggression towards a target 
individual or redirect received aggression towards 
a third party) and affiliative interactions (effec-
tively disrupt the affiliative interactions of other 
individuals). Moreover, there were striking differ-
ences in the distribution of deceptive acts across 
the seven functional behavioural categories of 
deception commonly used by the individuals 
in each of these troops; these included affilia-
tive behaviour, threat behaviour, non-responsive 
behaviour, inhibition of interest, non-contextual 
behaviour and calls, neutral behaviour and diver-
sion of aggression (see also Ref. 41)
8  Is Macaque Tactical Deception 
Mentalistic?
What was more critical, however, was to deter-
mine whether the acts of intentional deception 
displayed by the macaques actually involved, 
additionally, an effective reading of the audi-
ence’s mental states. The hallmarks of a cogni-
tive behaviour, which could potentially rule out 
the possibility that it was generated simply by 
associative learning paradigms, are generalisa-
tion, variability and flexibility.8
A notable feature of the deception dis-
played by certain individual macaques in the 
study troops, in accordance with these require-
ments, was their ability to generalise the use of 
more than one kind of functional behavioural 
category to achieve the same goal. All seven 
behavioural categories, listed above, could thus 
be employed to avoid aggression directed at 
oneself. One particular adult male in one of the 
study troops, for instance, employed affiliative, 
threat- or non-responsive behaviour on dif-
ferent occasions to avoid aggression directed 
at himself. Some individuals were also capa-
ble of the converse generalisation, using one 
behavioural category to deceive in a number 
of different contexts. One of the study subadult 
males, for example, used affiliative behaviour 
to deceive in three different contexts, includ-
ing, in this particular case, avoiding aggression 
directed to oneself, effectuating aggression 
towards another individual or disrupting the 
sexual pursuit of an individual competing with 
itself for a potential mate. In general, affiliative 
behaviour was employed to deceive in all the 
seven contexts, described above, by individuals 
in the three study troops. Such generalisability 
of the use of different behavioural acts by wild 
bonnet macaques to deceive in different social 
contexts thus bear testimony to the essentially 
cognitive nature of tactical deception in this 
species.
Not only is tactical deception in bonnet 
macaques highly generalisable, there was strik-
ing individual variation in the performance of 
deceptive acts by individuals across the three 
study troops. Certain individuals thus exhib-
ited deceptive acts with very high frequency 
at levels significantly greater than that shown 
by other individuals within the troop; moreo-
ver, such deceptive abilities appeared to be 
independent of age categories and dominance 
ranks of the actors. The ability to deceive being 
independent of other individual attributes, 
including age, indicate that many of these 
acts could involve mentalism on the part of 
the actor rather than simple behaviour analy-
sis, as the latter would usually imply that rates 
of deception would increase with age and/or 
social experience.
Moreover, male bonnet macaques, which 
exhibited tactical deception at high levels, 
employed a relatively greater number of behav-
ioural categories to effectively deceive their target 
individuals.41 Given this remarkable variability in 
deceptive abilities and that complex social situa-
tions where deceptive behaviour could potentially 
be learnt are rare, it has been argued that certain 
individuals may have indeed been better deceiv-
ers, with perhaps greater insights into the power 
of manipulative behaviour than other individuals 
in the same troop.41
Certain individual bonnet macaques also 
displayed noteworthy flexibility within their 
repertoire of deceptive behaviour. To cite a 
striking example, nine of the sixteen acts of 
deception observed among the eight resi-
dent males of one particular study troop were 
performed by a single young subadult male 
within a period of 8 months from the time he 
had emigrated into the group.41 Remarkably, 
these nine acts belonged to all seven different 
576
Anindya Sinha
1 3 J. Indian Inst. Sci.| VOL 97:4| 567–582 December 2017 | journal.iisc.ernet.in
behavioural categories of deception. Addition-
ally, some events of tactical deception, shown by a 
few male macaques, were also extremely complex 
and involved several simple categories of decep-
tive acts juxtaposed together and performed in 
rapid succession to achieve a particular desired 
goal.41 These deceptive behavioural sequences 
indicate the ability of particular actors to inno-
vatively combine behavioural acts in a definite 
sequence—the syntax of such sequences demand 
further investigation.
If the arguments put forward regarding the 
mentalistic nature of at least some of the acts 
of tactical deception displayed by wild bon-
net macaques can be accepted, it would seem 
logical that such manipulation must necessarily 
involve at least second-order intentionality. This 
would mean, in simple terms, that an individual 
performs a deceptive act to change the belief 
system of the audience—and then takes advan-
tage of the false belief, which has been gener-
ated, to achieve a particular personal goal.
It is important to note that tactical decep-
tion in bonnet macaques may be under a certain 
degree of volitional control. Certain individ-
ual adult males, for example, were observed to 
change their repertoire of deceptive acts and 
significantly increase their frequency of decep-
tion following changes in their social environ-
ment, brought about by emigration into a foreign 
troop.41 A major difference that these individuals 
faced in the two situations was that of their domi-
nance ranks, which fell drastically once they had 
joined the new troop. It is, therefore, entirely pos-
sible that the perception of their specific positions 
in the rank hierarchy in the respective troops as 
well as the changing demands of the new social 
milieu may have triggered on a completely differ-
ent repertoire as well as increased rates of tactical 
deception in these individuals.
Finally, deceiving individual macaques occa-
sionally exhibited behavioural components of 
a deceptive strategy that did not appear to be 
compatible with the ‘belief ’ system that the actor 
appeared to communicate to the target indi-
viduals as its own.41 In these instances, the actor 
seemed incapable of recognising the internal 
consistency with which the different behavioural 
components of its deceptive strategy must be pre-
sented to its potential targets. An important point 
here is that notwithstanding its incompleteness, 
such a belief system must have been generated to 
alter the belief state of the audience—a return to 
second-order intentionality. What is also note-
worthy is that, in these cases, the target individu-
als also did not appear to have read the internal 
inconsistency of the actor’s deceptive strategy; 
this may have been due to their own theory of 
mind being similarly incomplete.41
9  Experiential Knowledge of the Self 
in Primates
What does the acquisition and application of 
experientially acquired knowledge of oneself sug-
gest of self-awareness and the concept of the self 
in nonhuman species such as bonnet macaques? 
Although traditionally considered an exclusive 
domain of humans, the nature of the self in other 
species and its appearance in our species has, 
more recently, begun to attract serious academic 
attention.49–51 These psychologists have clearly 
recognised an essential biological continuity of 
the self across species and its natural history over 
evolutionary time scales. In their comprehensive 
treatise on the evolution of the symbolic self, 
defined as the ability to both consider oneself 
as an object of one’s own reflection and to store 
the products of such reflections, abstract and/
or language-based, in memory,51 Sedikides and 
Skowronski52 distinguish between three aspects 
of the self: subjective self-awareness, objective 
self-awareness and symbolic self-awareness.
Subjective self-awareness, the cognitive capac-
ity of an organism to differentiate between itself 
and its socioecological environment, allows an 
individual to engage in some form of self-regu-
lation (a process where systemic parts coordinate 
the action of one another53) as well as perceive, 
interpret and change its environment through 
self-initiated action. It is crucial to note here that 
subjective self-awareness does not imply that cog-
nitive representations of the individual’s attrib-
utes are constructed and stored in memory52; 
there is only a ‘crude’ differentiation between the 
organism and its environment. This differentia-
tion is, however, essential for survival and, along 
with self-regulation and response to environmen-
tal stimuli, has been considered to be implicit or 
non-conscious.54 The processing of complex vis-
ual and auditory stimuli, cognitive representation 
of the physical and social environment, counting, 
remembering, categorisation, communication—
both with one another and with predators, use 
and manufacture of tools, and the development 
of effective problem-solving strategies55–57 have 
all been considered attributes of subjective self-
awareness. These cognitive abilities do not, how-
ever, assume a cognitive representation of self 
and can be successfully executed in the absence of 
such a representation.52
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Objective self-awareness, in contrast, has been 
variously defined (reviewed in Ref. 52 as an indi-
vidual’s cognitive capacity to “become the object 
of its own attention” (Gallup,58 to be aware of its 
“own state of mind”,59 and “to know it knows, 
to remember it remembers”.60 The presence of 
objective self-awareness implies the presence of a 
primitive cognitive representation of the self, also 
referred to as the ‘objectified self ’.52 Consequently, 
objective self-awareness allows for self-referential 
behaviour, enabling individuals to use their own 
knowledge to model the knowledge of other indi-
viduals, anticipate what other individuals might 
do in certain situations by attributing motives or 
intentions to them, and influence other individu-
als by intervening in their behaviour. It has been 
explicitly suggested that species without objective 
self-awareness should not exhibit such abilities 
and only the great apes, particularly orangutans, 
chimpanzees, bonobos and humans, amongst 
primates are objectively self-aware.52 Finally, 
the reflective capacity afforded by objective self-
awareness is believed to occur at an explicit or 
conscious level, and is able to regulate and vari-
ously control subjective self-awareness.52,54,60,61
Symbolic self-awareness, a unique capacity 
of adult humans alone, refers to both the lan-
guage-mediated and abstract representation of 
certain attributes of the self and the use of this 
representation to function effectively in affec-
tive, motivational and behavioural domains.51,52 
A close examination of the psychological basis of 
the human self suggests three closely related and 
occasionally functionally inter-related capaci-
ties: representational, executive and reflexive.51 
The representational capacity is able to acquire, 
maintain and organise self-relevant information, 
both concrete and abstract, and which can depict 
the past, present or future. These representations 
can also include meta-cognition (a comprehen-
sion of how others perceive one’s behaviour), 
information about dyadic relationships, one’s 
position within the group, or about intragroup 
dynamics and intergroup relations.51 The execu-
tive ability allows the symbolic self to regulate 
its relationship with its socioecological environ-
ment, primarily through the processes of valua-
tion (protecting and enhancing the self), learning 
(improving the skills and abilities of the self) and 
homeostasis (seeking and endorsing informa-
tion consistent with the self51; The third, reflexive, 
capacity of the self enables it to respond flexibly 
and dynamically to environmental changes by 
accessing and activating or deactivating different 
components of the stored self-knowledge. Fur-
thermore, Sedikides and Skowronski51 note that 
an interaction between the above three capaci-
ties of the self allows an individual to “process 
information in a way that is detached from the 
immediate environment, travel mentally in time, 
imagine and contemplate the future, simulate 
the consequences of one’s own actions, and take 
preparatory steps for what might come as well as 
reparative measures for what has come”.
To return to our discovery of the ability of 
bonnet macaques to represent some of their own 
attributes, including their respective positions 
in the dominance hierarchy prevailing in the 
group, it could be speculated whether such rep-
resentation characterises subjective or objective 
self-awareness in this species. Although, as men-
tioned above, objective self-awareness has been 
hypothesised to exist only in the great apes, two 
lines of evidence from our results24,41 could argue 
for the development of an objectified self in these 
macaques (sensu strictu52)
First, the integrative nature of the knowl-
edge acquired and organised by individual 
macaques allows them to simultaneously 
access information on the dominance ranks of 
more than one interacting individual and use 
these representations to aid social decision-
making, as shown above for allogrooming sup-
plants. The sophistication that characterises the 
nature of such knowledge, rarely documented 
earlier in nonhuman primates, surely provides a 
convincing case for objective self-awareness in 
this species, far beyond what has been postu-
lated to define subjective self-awareness.52
Second, our observations of certain behav-
ioural decisions made by bonnet macaques, as, 
for example, the retreat by dominant members of 
grooming dyads when their grooming partners 
were more socially attractive lead to the argu-
ment that the dominant females behaved as if 
they were guided by a ‘belief ’ that the approach-
ing individual was targeting their subordinate, 
but more socially attractive, companion.24,41 In 
other words, it would appear that this decision 
to retreat was taken on the basis of a belief that 
a highly socially attractive individual was more 
likely, in general, to be the preferred target for 
affiliative interactions, even if she held a rela-
tively low position in the dominance hierarchy. 
That such a belief might indeed be valid is sup-
ported by our earlier observation that there was 
a strong positive correlation between the number 
of approaches that the dominant female of the 
allogrooming dyad received from other females 
and her social attractiveness.24 The nature of this 
belief and the attribution of a corresponding 
motive to the approaching individual also seem to 
578
Anindya Sinha
1 3 J. Indian Inst. Sci.| VOL 97:4| 567–582 December 2017 | journal.iisc.ernet.in
be rather pragmatic, as female bonnet macaques 
evaluate social attractiveness of an individual on 
the basis of the levels of allogrooming received 
and the consistency with which such grooming is 
received from other females in the troop.
The display of intentional, and often inno-
vative, tactical deception by certain individuals, 
with the underlying possibility that these behav-
ioural strategies involve second-order intention-
ality also provides support to the idea that these 
deceiving individuals acted as if they intended 
to change the belief system of the targets of their 
deception. Bonnet macaques thus seem to be 
capable of attributing motives to other individu-
als within their social matrix, suggesting that 
they may be able to develop beliefs about such 
motives.
What is important to point out here is that 
the attribution of such motives or intentions 
to other individuals is a definitive hallmark of 
objective self-awareness, which usually ena-
bles organisms to model the behaviour of other 
organisms on the basis of their own knowledge 
and, in the process, anticipate how these indi-
viduals might act in certain situations by attrib-
uting intentions to them.52
10  Mental Representation of Individual 
Attributes
Although the egotistical, integrative and hierarchi-
cal nature of the knowledge acquired, organised, 
memorised and applied during social decision-
making by individual bonnet macaques must 
obviously call for some form of fairly sophisti-
cated mental representation of particular indi-
viduals, including themselves, in association with 
certain specific properties, what remains unclear 
is how such information is exactly categorised 
and coded for in the non-verbal cognitive archi-
tecture of the macaque mind. Although there have 
been extensive studies on category formation and 
some of its underlying cognitive mechanisms with 
respect to physical objects or features (reviewed, 
for example, in,62) the formation of social catego-
ries, particularly with regard to conspecific indi-
viduals, remains largely unstudied in nonhuman 
species.
In general, there are two kinds of social cat-
egorisations that social species such as bonnet 
macaques may have achieved: recognition of 
conspecific individuals with identification of par-
ticular individuals and the representation of tran-
sitivity in social hierarchies.
An essential cognitive requirement for any 
individual would be to differentiate between 
members of different species, especially between 
conspecific and heterospecific individuals, and 
often between different categories of conspecifics 
such as dominant and subordinate members of its 
own social group or between related kin and non-
related members of the group. In a classic study 
on two captive longtailed macaque individuals, 
Verena Dasser showed that the subject individu-
als were able to distinguish photographic slides of 
familiar individuals from their own social group 
from those of unfamiliar members of another 
group and between slides of familiar individuals 
dominant or subordinate to other group mem-
bers and, presumably, to themselves as well.63 
Remarkably, she further showed that these indi-
viduals were capable of distinguishing between 
mother–infant pairs and other unrelated adult 
female-infant pairs in their social group as also 
differentiate between adult sister and non-sister 
pairs in the group.64 This study on social recog-
nition thus clearly demonstrates the capacity of 
macaques to abstract certain general classes of 
social relationships (mother–offspring or sisters) 
within their social group although, admittedly, it 
is not evident whether they were able to form a 
social concept of these relationships in general, 
that is, beyond their own familiar social group. 
Thus, do macaques form conceptual categories 
of the social bonds that exist between conspecific 
individuals in general, including dominant–sub-
ordinate relationships? Our study individuals 
appeared to distinguish between different classes 
of dominant and subordinate individuals, rela-
tive to their own social rank, within their group. 
But were they able to form abstract categories 
of dominance and subordination that would 
allow them to recognise such individuals when 
they observed unfamiliar social groups? Neither 
Dasser’s studies on captive longtailed macaques 
nor ours on wild bonnet macaques have tested 
for such a capacity—and this is a crucial step that 
needs to be taken in the future before we can con-
clusively argue for the ability of these species to 
form truly abstract concepts of social relation-
ships as we do.
A second capability that needs to be investi-
gated is whether individual macaques can con-
ceptualise a linear, transitive, hierarchical order 
as exemplified by a social dominance hierarchy 
that typically prevails within their social group. 
Dasser showed that her longtailed macaque sub-
jects correctly recognised the dominance–subor-
dination relationships that existed in the group 
and the identity of the various group members, 
the slides of which were presented to them (63 
unpublished; summarised in Ref. 65,66). The 
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macaques had thus formed and had access to an 
empirical concept of the asymmetry that charac-
terises a dominance hierarchy. It is also apparent 
that such a mental representation went beyond 
the simple memory of pairwise interactions 
of the group members, a salient finding of our 
own study on bonnet macaques as well.24 There 
is, however, no evidence, in either study, of the 
macaques having formed an abstract concept of 
asymmetric dominance relationships that could 
be generalised even across unfamiliar individuals, 
as discussed above with regard to the conceptuali-
sation of social relationships as well. There is also 
no support from Dasser’s studies of individuals 
being able to generate a social transitive order or 
to represent social transitivity as a conceptual cat-
egory that would generally apply to dominance–
subordination relationships. It is instructive that 
in our study too, logistic regression analyses 
clearly failed to provide any evidence of bonnet 
macaques knowing the absolute dominance ranks 
of their group members—a possible correlate of 
being able to assign all interacting individuals 
to specific positions in a dominance rank order. 
They were able to assign ranks to these individu-
als in relation to themselves and knew the domi-
nant–subordinate positions of interacting pairs of 
females. It has been argued that a cognitive pro-
cess that underlies a truly perceptive inference of 
social transitivity should be able to anticipate the 
most likely outcome of a third dominance–subor-
dination contest on the basis of visually acquired, 
remembered information on the status of two 
conspecifics in combination with the observ-
er’s own dominance or subordination experi-
ence with at least one of the conspecifics.62 The 
authors also suggest that short-term recognition 
of the visually and/or socially familiar individu-
als too must be involved in the prediction of the 
transitive outcome while long-term individual 
recognition should strengthen the stability of 
the knowledge of linear dominance in groups of 
socially interacting individuals.
An alternate cognitive mechanism has been 
put forward by Cheney and Seyfarth,7 who sug-
gest that, instead of transitive inference, individ-
ual primates may have the capacity of associative 
transitivity, by virtue of which they may be able to 
internally represent the sequential order among a 
series of individuals; the ordering would require 
a simple prior association between two particular 
individuals, say A and C, which become related 
but not according to a relational rule common 
to the antecedent pairs of stimuli, here A–B and 
B–C. Individuals could thus consistently form 
representations of the relationships between 
individuals that interact relatively frequently. For 
example, if an individual Z is dominated at very 
high rates by all the individuals in the group while 
an individual A dominates all these individuals, 
the ability to deduce associative transitivity would 
recognise the clear prevailing asymmetry between 
individuals A and Z, and spontaneously conclude 
that A would most probably dominate Z. No true 
deductive inference is necessary to represent such 
a transitive link. Unfortunately, there has not 
been any clear demonstration yet of nonhuman 
species being able to mentally construct and cat-
egorise a linear dominance hierarchy on a percep-
tive basis or on a purely conceptual one.
It is nevertheless important to reiterate here 
that our study individuals appeared to be able 
to conceptualise the dominant–subordinate 
relationships of their group members relative to 
themselves but it remains unclear how they were 
able to achieve this mechanistically. Was there 
a form of visual behaviour matching that they 
were able to accomplish and generalise, at least 
within their own group? Moreover, during triadic 
interactions, the integrative property of the bon-
net macaque’s knowledge system allowed her to 
respond appropriately to the relative dominance 
ranks of the two other interacting individuals. It 
is striking, therefore, that whatever may have been 
the stored imagery of the individual attributes of 
the two females she was interacting with, it was 
possible for her, as discussed above, to access both 
these stored resources and integrate them when 
finally making a socially complex decision.
11  Experiential Knowledge in the 
Socioecological World
It is noteworthy that an elaborate example of tool 
manufacture and use by a wild female bonnet 
macaque from the same study troop, that we had 
documented earlier, indicated the possibility that 
the individual was able to perceive the underlying 
causality of her actions and also form a mental 
model of the tool to which she could repeatedly 
refer.67 In the course of our long-term study on 
the ecology, demography and behaviour of wild 
bonnet macaques in the Mudumalai Wildlife 
Sanctuary (see Sinha et al. 2005 for details), we 
later observed yet another complex behaviour on 
the banks of the River Moyar in June 2004. Two 
young adult males (from a group of five bach-
elor males) systematically collected and washed 
wild mangoes that floated down the river, prior 
to consuming them. On one such occasion, one 
of these males misplaced a mango that he was 
washing and conducted a very directed search for 
580
Anindya Sinha
1 3 J. Indian Inst. Sci.| VOL 97:4| 567–582 December 2017 | journal.iisc.ernet.in
it by feeling the shallow river floor close to the 
bank with his left hand. In addition to providing 
evidence for a planned, goal-driven action, this 
observation suggests that individual macaques 
appear to know the shape, feel or texture of a food 
item such as a mango, once again strong evidence 
for a capacity to characterise the physical proper-
ties of objects and remember them through sub-
jective self-awareness.
In conclusion, the ability to form mental rep-
resentations, generated by direct personal experi-
ence, appears to underlie the bonnet macaque’s 
interactions with both the mechanical as well as 
the social components of her immediate environ-
ment. This suggests a rather early evolutionary 
origin for fairly sophisticated cognitive capabili-
ties, characterised by an objectified self with lim-
ited regulatory control over more subjective levels 
of self-awareness, in cercopithecine primates, pre-
dating those of the great apes. The nature of the 
objective self-awareness displayed by bonnet 
macaque, however, appears to be unusual in terms 
of the features believed to typify this kind of self-
awareness.62 While individual macaques seem to 
be remarkably adept at acquiring fairly compre-
hensive and exact knowledge of the positions of 
different individuals in the dominance hierar-
chy relative to themselves, they may not be able 
to rank them in a linear transitive order or form 
abstractions of such a hierarchy. Individuals may 
also be able to attribute motives or intentions to 
the group members they interact with although 
they may occasionally hold erroneous beliefs and 
fail to project their experiences while predicting 
the behavioural motivations of other individuals 
(see also.41 Finally, female bonnet macaques may 
be capable of accessing and integrating informa-
tion on the dominance ranks of two (and more?) 
individuals while making a social decision during 
interactions with these individuals while certain 
individual macaques may be capable of attribut-
ing and manipulating the belief systems of other 
individuals. These are major advancements over 
simple one-on-one decision-making driven by 
associative learning paradigms, which have long 
been considered typical of most nonhuman spe-
cies, including non-ape primates. We must, there-
fore, conclude this essay with the speculation that 
bonnet macaques might represent an interme-
diate stage in the evolution of self-awareness in 
animals, a process that began with the subjective 
awareness that characterises most, if not all, spe-
cies and culminated in the most sophisticated 
form of symbolic self-awareness, which appears 
to be the hallmark of the human species alone.
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